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Abstract
Although increasing public spending on health worker (HW) recruitments could reduce workforce shortages in sub-Saharan Africa, effective
strategies for achieving this are still unclear. We aimed to understand the process of transitioning HWs from President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to Government of Uganda (GoU) payrolls and to explore the facilitators and barriers encountered in increasing domestic
financial responsibility for absorbing this expanded workforce. We conducted a multiple case study of 10 (out of 87) districts in Uganda which
received PEPFAR support between 2013 and 2015 to expand their health workforce. We purposively selected eight districts with the highest
absorption rates (‘high absorbers’) and two with the lowest absorption rates (‘low absorbers’). A total of 66 interviews were conducted with
high-level officials in three Ministries of Finance, Health and Public Service (n=14), representatives of PEPFAR-implementing organizations
(n=16), district health teams (n=15) and facility managers (n=22). Twelve focus groups were conducted with 87 HWs absorbed on GoU
payrolls. We utilized the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research to guide thematic analysis. At the sub-national level, facilitators of
transition in ‘high absorber’ districts were identified as the presence of transition ‘champions’, prioritizing HWs in district wage bill commitments,
host facilities providing ‘bridge financing’ to transition workforce during salary delays and receiving donor technical support in district wage bill
analysis—attributes that were absent in ‘low absorber’ districts. At the national level, multi-sectoral engagements (incorporating the influential
Ministry of Finance), developing a joint transition road map, aligning with GoU salary scales and recruitment processes emerged as facilitators
of the transition process. Our case studies offer implementation research lessons on effective donor transition and insights into pragmatic
strategies for increasing public spending on expanding the health workforce in a low-income setting.
Keywords: Human Resources for Health, health systems, decentralization, HIV, donor transition, implementation research, overseas development assistance
Key messages
• Providing technical support in conducting district wage bill
analyses can reveal unutilized funds for workforce recruit-
ments in Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
• Aligning with donor–recipient government salary scales
and operating within established recruitment procedures
enhances chances of enrolment of donor-contracted health
workers onto the public sector payroll.
• Targeted donor aid can help unblock systemic barriers to
expanding the health workforce in decentralized settings in
LMICs.
• Multi-sectoral engagements incorporating the Ministry of
Finance are critical in realizing effective donor transitions.
Introduction
Health workforce shortages constitute a fundamental barrier
to the attainment of health-related sustainable development
goals in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Freer, 2017). It is estimated
that health worker (HW) vacancies are as high as 59–70% in
several countries in SSA (Vermund et al., 2012; Zakumumpa
et al., 2016; Jaskiewicz et al., 2016).
In countries with decentralized health systems in SSA,
health workforce recruitments have been devolved from the
central government to sub-national administrative units com-
monly referred to as districts in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and
Uganda (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Munga et al., 2009;
Sakyi, 2013; Abimbola et al., 2019; Sumah and Baatiema,
2019).
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The recruitment of HWs in district health systems in SSA
is however beset by a myriad of institutional constraints.
These include delays in recruitment owing to cumbersome and
lengthy administrative procedures, the ubiquitous ‘vacancies
but no wage bill’ constraint and a shortage of payroll analysis
expertise (Munga et al., 2009; Sakyi, 2013; Frumence et al.,
2013; Mbemba et al., 2016; Sumah and Baatiema, 2019).
In Uganda, decentralization was a part of governance
reforms that date as far back as 1992 (Awortwi, 2010;
Tashobya et al., 2016). Health sector decentralization was
formally provided for under the 1995 national constitution
and further operationalized in the Local Government Act of
1997 (Tashobya et al., 2016). Uganda’s district health sys-
tem comprises of a district hospital and lower-level primary
care health facilities (Alonso-Garbayo et al., 2017). In 2014,
management of the public sector payroll processing system
was further decentralized to districts (Lwanga et al., 2018).
District recruitment bodies known as ‘district service commis-
sions’ conduct interviews and selections of HWs. However,
devolved recruitment, in practice, is a shared responsibil-
ity between the districts (which declare vacancies and make
recruitment decisions) and relevant central government line
ministries such as Finance and Public Service which com-
mit funds to the public sector wage bill. There exists a
heavy dependence by districts on central government grants
for both capital development and basic operational funds
(Alonso-Garbayo et al., 2017).
HW shortages are pervasive at all levels of the health
system in Uganda (Zakumumpa et al., 2017). In 2012, the
Uganda government implemented an aggressive health work-
force recruitment programme known as ‘the surge’ in which
7112 HWs were recruited to plug severe staffing gaps at
the primary care level (Jaskiewicz et al., 2016). Specifically,
HWs were recruited at the level of Health Centre IVs (sub-
district) and Health Centre IIIs (sub-county). However, severe
staffing gaps remained at the level of district hospitals that
have relatively high Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
client loads (Zakumumpa et al., 2016). In response to these
staffing gaps, and in order to accelerate progress towards HIV
epidemic control in Uganda, President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) developed a 3-year ‘Human Resources
for Health Support Program’ in 2013 that was implemented in
87 focus districts (USAID, 2019). According to the implemen-
tation plan, the HWs would be initially recruited on contract
by PEPFAR for a period of 2 years but would subsequently
be absorbed into the mainstream public service as soon as fis-
cal space allowed. A total of 3154 HWs were recruited by
PEPFAR in Uganda between 2012 and 2015. Of these, 694
were enrolled onto the Government of Uganda (GoU) payroll
between 2013 and 2017 (USAID, 2019). An additional 1965
HWs were expected to be transitioned to the GoU in a phased
manner between 2017 and 2020.
There has been increasing international assistance in
addressing the human resources for health crisis in SSA in the
quest to sustain public health gains during periods of donor
support and to sustain these outcomes during donor transi-
tion (Micah et al., 2018). This has motivated analyses by
external donors and recipient governments around increasing
reliance on domestic financing (Amaya et al., 2014; Bennett
et al., 2015; Burrows et al., 2016; Vogus and Graff, 2015;
Resch and Hecht, 2018; Gotsadze et al., 2019). Fiscal space
has been defined as ‘the capacity of government to provide
additional budgetary resources for a desired purpose with-
out any prejudice to the sustainability of its financial position’
(Heller, 2006). As donors like PEPFAR reduce their financial
support to workforce costs, little is known about which fac-
tors hinder or facilitate increases on public spending on HW
recruitments within the government. These data are critical
to understanding the dynamics involved and strategies needed
for increasing domestic financial responsibility and local own-
ership by recipient countries (Vermund et al., 2012; Palen
et al., 2012; Amaya et al., 2014; Bennett et al., 2015; Vogus
and Graff, 2015; Burrows et al., 2016; Resch and Hecht,
2018).
Although there is an accumulating evidence base on the
notion of decision space in district health systems, in gen-
eral (Bossert and Mitchell, 2011; Liwanag and Wyss, 2018;
Henriksson et al., 2019; Bulthuis et al., 2021), and around
Human Resources for Health in particular (Alonso-Garbayo
et al., 2017; Sumah and Baatiema, 2019), there is little empir-
ical attention to the prospect of increasing public spending on
expanding the health workforce in decentralized settings in
low-income countries. We aimed to understand the process
of transitioning HWs from PEPFAR contracts to the Uganda
government payroll and to explore the facilitators and barri-




We utilized a qualitative case-study research design. Case
studies are recommended for an in-depth understanding of
complex phenomena within organizations (Yin, 2003; Gilson,
2012). We conducted a multiple case study of 10 districts
in Uganda categorized into two: (1) eight districts with the
highest rates of absorption of HWs recruited with PEPFAR
support dubbed ‘high absorbers’ cases and (2) two districts
with the lowest absorption rates or the ‘low absorbers’ cases.
We then conducted a comparative analysis across the two cat-
egories of cases with regard to facilitators and barriers to HW
transition.
Case-study selection
The 10 case-study districts were purposively selected from
87 districts in Uganda, which received PEPFAR support in
recruiting HWs between 2013 and 2017. Study districts were
purposively selected based on secondary analysis of databases
in the Human Resources Information System (HRIS) and a
locally based international PEPFAR-implementing organiza-
tion’s databases of HWs recruited between 2015 and 2017.
From these databases, we selected districts with the highest
number of HWs transitioned from PEPFAR to GoU payrolls.
Table 1 shows we selected districts with the highest number of
HWs transitioned from each of eight geographic sub-regions
as defined by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (Iganga, Sheema,
Apac, Kasese, Napak, Nwoya, Tororo and Kampala) and
based on HIV burden (which was the key focus of PEPFAR
support). We aimed to achieve diversity in our sample of dis-
tricts by setting (rural/urban). The detailed inclusion criteria
are described Table 1. Due to logistical limitations, we selected
only two districts with the lowest number of HWs absorbed






/heapol/advance-article/doi/10.1093/heapol/czab077/6317746 by guest on 09 July 2021
Health Policy and Planning, 2021, Vol. 00, No. 0 3









Sheema 7.7 High number of transi-
tioned HWs and high
HIV prevalence
East Central Iganga 4.4 High number of tran-
sitioned HWs, mixed
rural–urban










Central 2 Mubende 7.4 High number of transi-








North East Napac 3.4 High number of transi-
tioned HWs and hard
to reach, rural




districts had absorbed only ‘one’ HW since 2013 when PEP-
FAR’s health workforce transition programme commenced in
Uganda.
Conceptual framework
We utilized an implementation research lens (Proctor et al.,
2011) to understand the process of transitioning HWs from
PEPFAR to the Uganda government payroll and in order to
explore the facilitators and barriers involved in this process.
More specifically, we adopted the Consolidated Framework
for Implementation Research (CFIR) as the analytical frame-
work underpinning this study (Damschroder et al., 2009). The
CFIR is a ‘meta-theoretical’ framework that was informed
by earlier implementation research frameworks. The CFIR
is derived from a robust systematic review of factors influ-
encing the implementation of ‘interventions’ (Means et al.,
2020). The CFIR framework provides a multi-level analysis
lens that entails 39 constructs categorized under 5 ‘domains’
(‘intervention characteristics’, ‘outer setting’, ‘inner setting’,
‘characteristics of individuals’ and ‘process of implementa-
tion’). ‘Intervention characteristics’ refer to the attributes of
the intervention itself such as perceptions of its effectiveness
by stakeholders, its design quality, its adaptability and its
cost-effectiveness. ‘Outer setting’ implies factors originating
from the external environment such as those emerging from
outside of the host implementing organization such as exter-
nal policies and legal frameworks. ‘Inner setting’ refers to
factors influencing the uptake of an intervention that derive
from the internal organizational context such as culture, cli-
mate and readiness for implementation. ‘Characteristics of
individuals’ refer to the personal attributes of the individu-
als involved in implementing the intervention such as their
self-efficacy, knowledge levels, competence and value sys-
tems. ‘Process of implementation’ refers to the various stages
involved in rolling out the intervention and its influence on
implementation success such as the quality of planning and
level of stakeholder engagement. The CFIR guided this study
in three ways. It informed the diverse range of study partici-
pants selected for this study, especially those involved in the
transition of the contract workforce onto the public sector
payroll. It helped in constructing our qualitative interview
guides during data collection and provided an overarching
deductive thematic framework for our synthesis and interpre-
tation of study findings and in their presentation (Means et al.,
2020).
Data collection
In keeping with the CFIR framework’s multi-level analysis
lens, we selected study participants involved in the transi-
tion process at the ‘policy and planning’, ‘programmatic’
and ‘implementation’ levels: (1) national-level policy and
planning actors, e.g. sector ministry officials (Ministry of
Health, Finance and Public Service) and PEPFAR as well as
its ‘implementing partner (IP)’ playing the overall national
coordination function of overseeing the transition process;
(2) sub-national operational-level actors [e.g. district health
officers (DHOs), district personnel officers and PEPFAR-
implementing organizations at the sub-national operational
level]; (3) facility-level actors (hospital administrators and the
principal nursing officers (head nurse) and transitioned HWs
across diverse cadres. The category of participants is shown
in Table 2.
We conducted 15 face-to-face key informant interviews
(KIIs) with national-level actors who had ‘insider’ insights
into the HW transition process right from inception [e.g. dur-
ing the signing of memorandums of understanding (MoUs)]
such as the overall coordinating PEPFAR-implementing orga-
nization, programme officers in the United States embassy
in Uganda and high-level technocrats in line Ministries
Table 2. Category of participants
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of Health, Finance and Public Service who were directly
involved in the inception meetings and in the consensus build-
ing between PEPFAR and the Uganda government around
absorption of HWs after their 2-year contract period.
We then conducted 24 in-depth interviews with district-
level actors in 10 case-study districts who were directly
involved in the implementation of health workforce transi-
tion at the sub-national level. These included DHOs and
district human resources officers. The interview guide used in
our interviews was constructed around the five CFIR-derived
domains (‘process of implementation’, ‘intervention charac-
teristics’, ‘outer setting’, ‘inner setting’ and ‘characteristics
of individuals’). This overarching framework helped in elic-
iting the facilitators and barriers to HW transition. Data
were collected over two rounds. For the ‘high absorber’ cases,
data were collected between June and September 2018 (round
1) and January to March 2020 (round 2) among the ‘low
absorber’ case districts.
Twelve focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted
with 87 HWs who were transitioned onto the public pay-
roll in the case-study districts to better understand transition
enablers and barriers from their perspective. Ten focus groups
were conducted in ‘high absorber’ districts, while two FGDs
were conducted in ‘low absorber’ districts. The interviews
were conducted in English by HZ and JR, with the assistance
of four research assistants who operated the recorder and took
notes.
To augment respondent data, we conducted a desk review
of relevant documents such as ‘PEPFAR’s Human Resources
for Health (HRH) Support for Recruitment—Implementation
plan of April 2013’. We reviewed written memos from two
central government line Ministries of Public Service and
Health addressed to district local government leaders, urging
them to absorb the health workforce recruited with PEPFAR
support.
Data analysis
Qualitative data were analysed in line with the procedures
recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). Interviews
were recorded in English, transcribed verbatim into text tran-
scripts by four research assistants. Data were analysed, in
an iterative process, involving four major steps: (1) ‘data
familiarization’ (HZ, JR read the interview transcripts mul-
tiple times); (2) ‘developing a coding framework’: we adopted
the five CFIR-derived domains (‘intervention characteristics’,
‘outer setting’, ‘inner setting’, ‘characteristics of individuals’
and ‘process of implementation’) as an overarching deduc-
tive thematic framework as well as inductively, from the data
(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006); (3) ‘data abstraction’
of the coded data into thematic categories while engaging in
a constant comparative analysis across the two categories of
cases of ‘high absorber’ and ‘lower absorber’ districts (Glaser
and Strauss, 1999) and (4) ‘overall interpretation and synthe-
sis’: the final analyses were reached by consensus in a process
involving at least four of the authors.
In addition, we adopted the recommended procedures for
ensuring rigour in case-study analysis (Gilson et al., 2011).
Results
The identified facilitators and barriers to HW transition
emerging from this study are presented based on the five
CFIR-derived domains.
Table 3. Milestones in the HW transition implementation process
Level and stakeholders Key actions
National • MoU between PEPFAR and GoU
• Harmonization of salaries
• Inter-sector transition meetings
around a road map Developing a
transition road map
District • Joint Planning by regionally-based IPs
and district actors
• Determining district HRH needs
• Wage bill analysis
• HW recruitment and deployment
Health facility level • HW orientation
• HW performance management
during the contract phase
Process of implementation
Table 3 shows the milestones in the process of implementa-
tion of the HW transition process. Implementation happened
at three major levels: (1) national-level ‘policy planning and
coordination’, (2) sub-national level ‘programmatic supervi-
sion’ and (3) facility-level ‘implementation’.
National-level stakeholder engagement and transition
planning
At the national level, the process involved consensus-building
meetings between PEPFAR and GoU high-level actors around
absorption of the recruited workforce after phasing out of
support. This culminated in a formal MoU between the
two parties. The MoU stipulated that PEPFAR would pro-
vide funds for the recruitment process and salary support
for the initial 2 years, and GoU would subsequently enrol
the recruited HWs on the public sector payroll as soon
as fiscal space allowed. Inter-sector meetings were con-
vened incorporating the relevant line Ministries of Health,
Finance and Public Service. PEPFAR was represented by
its overall national coordinating agency—an international
non-governmental organization, which consulted with rel-
evant programme officers at the United States embassy in
Uganda. In 2013, a HW transition implementation plan and a
road map were jointly agreed through a consultative process
involving the two parties. Salary harmonization was a key
point whereby PEPFAR would pay the recruited workforce
(during their 2-year contract phase) salaries that were compa-
rable to GoU salary scales. With the exception of payment of
an housing allowance to the contract workforce, PEPFAR’s
pay structure was well aligned with the GoU. The PEP-
FAR national coordinating agency continually monitored the
transition process and regularly shared insights and progress
reports with the Ministry of Health’s Human Resources for
Health Technical Working Group.
At the district level, regionally based PEPFAR IP organi-
zations in the 87 focus districts in Uganda held transition
planning meetings that engaged district-level actors such as
district health teams, chief administrative officers (CAOs) and
district human resource officers as well as district service
commissions (DSCs), which make personnel selection deci-
sions. During such meetings, a transition road map at the
district level and the roles of the varied stakeholders were
agreed upon. District health teams in conjunction with district
personnel offices determined the HW cadres to be recruited
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Anesthetic officer 0 0.0
Total 694 99.9
the bulk of HWs recruited across case-study districts were
midwives, nurses and clinical officers. These vacancies were
advertised in national newspapers and through district and
facility notice boards. The processes of initial formal recruit-
ment were led by the districts with the financial support of
PEPFAR provided through its regionally based IPs. Across
all districts, contract staff were vetted by the DSCs to ensure
that they met the Uganda public service standards for recruit-
ment. The IPs managed contracts and payrolls during the
2-year contract phase for the transition workforce. In most
of the 87 focus districts, an independent PEPFAR contractor
was mentioned as the personnel contracts and payroll man-
agement agency. The district health teams together with IPs
monitored the performance of contract HWs through instru-
ments such as time sheets that were a basis for approving
salaries.
At the facility level, contract staff were oriented in pub-
lic service processes by their immediate supervisors. The
district health teams and facility service managers were
instrumental in providing supervision and appraisal of con-
tract staff. This formed the basis of the selection of HWs
on contract who were to be absorbed onto the public
payroll.
Characteristics of the intervention
District wage bill budget analysis support
Although PEPFAR support triggered the creation of 694 ‘new’
wage bill slots for additional HWs in intervention districts,
our findings suggest that a small part of these slots was derived
from the unutilized wage bill in district budgets.
Technical support for district wage bill analyses was
extended by the coordinating PEPFAR-implementing organi-
zation to districts. This was reported as a facilitator of the
HW transition process in ‘high absorber’ districts. Although
there was a widely held perception, among actors within the
district administrations that their budgets could not accom-
modate any new personnel recruitments, technical support
in scrutinizing district wage bills revealed unutilized funds
that were subsequently committed to absorbing the contract
workforce.
PEPFAR helped us analyze the wage bill budget. There
was some confusion with the Ministry of Public service and
Ministry of Health and here at the district. We were in the
dark. So, PEPFAR came and analyzed and found that we
had a balance (funds for salaries) which we were not using
(KII, district official, Iganga).
Conversely, in ‘low absorber’ districts, participants
reported that they did not receive technical support in wage
bill analyses. Hence, donor support in wage bill analyses
emerged as a distinguishing feature between the two cate-
gories of ‘high absorber’ and ‘low absorber’ districts.
However, Figure 1, which is generated from the secondary
analysis of the HRIS database, shows that even across the
‘high absorber’ districts there were still a significant number
of contract staff who were not enrolled onto the public sec-
tor payroll. Wage bill ceilings limited the ability of districts to
absorb a higher number of contract staff. We observed that
‘low absorber’ districts had a higher number of their contract
staff seconded to private not-for-profits (PNFPs) such as mis-
sion hospitals that had an even weaker absorption capacity
(at 30%) compared to district local governments (at 55%).
The absorption has been very slow in PNFPs because these
did not have money to absorb them. Most PNFPs were
comfortable offering services with low cadre staff and do
not have a budget to hire high cadre staff. But PEPFAR
hired these staff for the HIV response but health facilities
do not have income to maintain them (KII, national-level
official).
Secondary analyses of HRIS and PEPFAR databases
revealed that over 500 of the recruited workforce were not
absorbed in GoU service after transition. Figure 2, which is
derived from these secondary analyses, shows the number of
HWs absorbed between 2012 and 2017. Across case-study
districts, a number of HWs left government service before
they were formally absorbed. In the focus group, HWs shed
light on why this was the case. The reasons include prolonged
delays in accessing the public payroll after their 2-year PEP-
FAR contracts had run out, a lack of private accommodation
(especially in rural Northern Uganda) and challenging work
environments such as chronic stock-outs of supplies. Many
of the unabsorbed HWs opted for alternative employment—
mostly in the private sector.
Support in convening district personnel recruitment
committees
PEPFAR support helped in unlocking long-standing orga-
nizational barriers to the expansion of the existing health
workforce in ‘high absorber’ cases. A lack of basic operational
funds for supporting the lengthy procedures required for hir-
ing new staff was a constraint raised across all case-study
districts. DSCs are standing committees that make person-
nel selection decisions and are meant to sit every 3 months.
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Figure 1. Number of HWs absorbed in ‘high absorber’ districts
Figure 2. Number of HWs transitioned between 2014 and 2017
owing to a chronic inability to raise monetary allowances for
paying the non-full-time DSCs that are comprised of retired
senior public servants. Running district job adverts in national
newspapers was said to be prohibitively expensive. PEPFAR
provided the necessary funding to kick-start recruitment pro-
cesses in form of paying for newspaper job adverts, providing
monetary allowances to DSCs and sent observers to meet-
ings where job interviews were conducted, which enhanced
transparency and objectivity in the selection processes. United
States embassy programme officers in Uganda reported that
PEPFAR had committed $9 333 891 for the HW transition
programme in 2012 alone and an additional $4 494 149
in 2015. District-level informants described the nature of
PEPFAR support they received:
PEPFAR helped with providing the recruitment funds.
It provided sitting allowances to enable District Service
Commissions to convene as well as providing allowances
to committee members during the interview of candidates.
They facilitated most of the activities utilizing our own
technical staff (KII, district official, Sheema District).
Transparency in recruitment of the transitioned health
workforce
A number of HWs reported that before the PEPFAR inter-
vention, DSCs had a reputation of questionable objectivity
in the selection of personnel due to a widely held percep-
tion that nepotism and bribery were common in district
personnel recruitment decisions. Given this context, the selec-
tion of PEPFAR-supported HWs through transparent and
merit-based processes lent special legitimacy to the transi-
tion workforce, which enhanced their absorption prospects
into public service. District- and facility-level managers per-
ceived PEPFAR-supported personnel as having been recruited
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I look at it as a good strategy for recruiting staff. This issue
of our local politics of you are going to recruit this one’s
daughter (nepotism), you are going to solicit bribes… those
ones didn’t surface anywhere. It was a purified process that
government didn’t have any reason whatsoever to object to
their absorption. Someone recruited by an NGO interested
in health you can’t doubt their qualifications, you can’t
doubt their capabilities and then I think it also eliminated
this issue of tribalism (ethnic biases) in recruitments (KII,
district official, Tororo).
The transitioned workforce was perceived as competent
for absorption into government service. The 2-year contract
phase funded by PEPFAR allowed facility-level managers to
identify resilient and dependable HWs for absorption. In addi-
tion, this phase also provided HWs with an opportunity to
be inducted and initiated into government systems and work
environments.
When they came the health workers on contract exhibited
professionalism in their work. They were good people and
immediately, they started working. The quality of service,
was realized by the community. I think there is a visi-
ble change in the hospital since they came in (KII, district
official, Apac).
Outer setting
Multi-sectoral engagements in transition process
At an institutional level, multi-stakeholder engagements
involving actors at the national, sub-national and facility
levels were identified as a major transition facilitator by par-
ticipants in ‘high absorber’ districts. At the national level,
PEPFAR was involved in multi-sectoral engagements of high-
level actors with authority for approving HW recruitments in
relevant central government sector ministries such as Finance,
Public Service and Health. A transition road map and an
MoU were agreed between PEPFAR and sector ministries
in which PEPFAR undertook to provide salary support of
the new workforce recruits for 2 years while the Uganda
government would enrol these HWs onto the public sec-
tor payroll as soon as fiscal space permitted. This facili-
tated buy-in from influential actors in sector ministries. At
the sub-national level, PEPFAR-implementing organizations
in the various geographic sub-regions spearheaded engage-
ment with sub-national actors such as district health officers
and CAOs. MoUs were signed between regionally based
PEPFAR-implementing organizations and the districts under
their purview.
We had several interactions. Ministry of Health invited us.
As a district, we are supposed to implement Ministry of
Health policies. The policy was such that PEPFAR would
recruit those health workers on contract and with time,
the districts, with help of Ministry of Health and Finance
would avail a wage bill to absorb them (KII, district official,
Sheema).
Crucially, PEPFARworked within established Uganda gov-
ernment recruitment processes and structures. Districts deter-
mined the cadres that would be hired based on their needs.
DSCs made the ultimate hiring decisions. This lent legitimacy
to the cohort of HWs recruited with PEPFAR support.
All recruitment of contract staff was done by DSCs. So
when it comes to absorption, such health workers are reg-
ularized because they were already recognized as legitimate
staff hired through competent structures (KII, national-
level official).
Inner setting
Prioritization ofHWs in district recruitments
The prioritization of HWs in district personnel recruitments
was a key distinguishing feature between ‘high absorber’ and
‘low absorber’ cases. In ‘high absorber’ districts such as Kas-
ese and Sheema, participants were unequivocal in relaying
the notion that their district administrations deliberately pri-
oritized the health workforce in recruitments. In the ‘high
absorber’ cases, whenever some fiscal space in the district
wage bill emerged, slots for HWs were ‘ring-fenced’ as the
overall priority. This took the shape of an informal recruit-
ment policy.
In fact we had to trade off some cadres, those ones who
were not extremely needed or useful we had to keep them
off in order to bring in the more useful staff like the
midwives and clinical officers (KII, district official, Apac).
You may have the wage bill but how are you going to pri-
oritize the cadres of peoples you are going to recruit? You
may say all Health Centre IIs need a security guard. You
may recruit like 20 porters. I know they are needed there
but is it a priority? (KII, district official, Sheema).
Although we found that ‘high absorber’ districts prioritized
HWs in their wage bill, national-level informants reported
that this was further reinforced by formal written memos.
The memos originated from Ministries of Public Service and
Health to the district political and technical leadership ask-
ing that they prioritize the absorption of PEPFAR-supported
workforce in the available wage bill of the districts. These
memos were written in March 2013 as a result of the pro-
tracted engagements by PEPFAR and high-level actors in
sector ministries that were in line with the agreed transition
road map.
Characteristics of individuals
Presence of transition ‘champions’
The presence or absence of transition ‘champions’ differen-
tiated between ‘high absorber’ and ‘low absorber’ districts.
Whereas ‘high absorber’ districts reported the presence of
internal transition ‘champions’, their absence in participant
discourses in ‘low absorber’ districts was unmistakable. Tran-
sition ‘champions’ were individuals who went above and
beyond the call of duty to promote the absorption of HWs
onto the public payroll. These champions were reported at
district and facility levels. The presence of champions at mul-
tiple levels created synergies in promoting HW absorption
in ‘high absorber’ districts. The frequently cited champi-
ons include influential actors such as CAOs of host districts,
DHOs and hospital administrators who actively pushed for
the recruitment and absorption of HWs and enrolment on the
government payroll.
We had a smooth transition because the team in XXX (Dis-






/heapol/advance-article/doi/10.1093/heapol/czab077/6317746 by guest on 09 July 2021
8 Health Policy and Planning, 2021, Vol. 00, No. 0
government. The CAO (Chief Administrative Officer) was
an experienced man so he was quick to come in and push
the recruitment process along. Much faster than is normally
the case. The District Human Resource Officer was very
active. They did their work in a timely way and actively
pushed to have the HWs absorbed (KII, district official,
Iganga).
Champions tirelessly worked to expedite processes in the
context of the typically lengthy administrative procedures
in the Ugandan public sector. They acted as ‘persistence
enhancers’ for HWs and even appropriated district finances
to create ‘stop-gap’ monetary allowances for HWs before they
were able to access the public payroll.
Actors at the facility level were frequently cited as transi-
tion champions. Facility in-charges were motivated by a need
to avoid losing skilled HWs who had been posted to their
health facilities. As such, they were instrumental in ensuring
timely appraisal of contract HWs but also engaged in active
follow-up with DSCs at the district administration head-
quarters for absorption of HWs. Facility in-charges in ‘high
absorber’ districts actively engaged their transition workforce
in activities such as surgical camps and community outreaches
to enable them secure some field monetary allowances to
sustain them as they awaited enrolment on the payroll.
The salaries could delay for two to three months. We have
PHC (primary health care) funds earmarked to this facility.
We used some of this to buy them basics such as soap and
sugar that could also help them to persist and endure (KII,
facility in-charge, Nwoya district).
Discussion
We conducted a multiple case study of 10 districts in Uganda
to better understand why they had variations in absorption
rates of the health workforce transitioned from PEPFAR pay-
roll support. We found distinguishing features between the
two ‘low absorber’ districts and the eight ‘high absorber’
districts. We found that in the latter cases, conducting a
wage bill analysis of district budgets to discover unutilized
funds, the presence of transition ‘champions’ and prioritiz-
ing HWs in the available district wage bill differentiated
them from the ‘low absorber’ districts where these attributes
were absent. At an institutional level, multi-stakeholder and
multi-sectoral engagements, agreeing on a joint transition
road map and PEPFAR’s alignment with Uganda govern-
ment salary scales and recruitment procedures enabled over
694 HWs to be added to the public sector payroll. How-
ever, district wage bill caps, prolonged delays in enrol-
ment onto the public sector payrolls and a lack of private
accommodation for transition HWs were common across
districts.
Implementation research and strategies for
effective donor transitions
The PEPFAR HW transition case studies documented here
offer implementation research lessons on effective donor tran-
sition for other global health initiatives and bilateral devel-
opment partners. We observe that, in this particular study,
PEPFAR’s transition model conforms with three (of the six)
donor transition ‘good practices’ that were earlier proposed
(Vogus and Graff, 2015). More specifically, we found that
agreeing on a joint transition road map, communicating early
about the transition intentions and aligning with Uganda gov-
ernment salary scales and recruitment procedures enhanced
health workforce absorption. In our analysis of participant
discourses, we noted that there were insufficient monitor-
ing and evaluation measures in the HW transition road map.
There is a sparse but emerging evidence base on recommended
donor transition planning and management in the health sec-
tor (Palen et al., 2012; Amaya et al., 2014; Bennett et al.,
2015; Vogus and Graff, 2015; Burrows et al., 2016).
Although previous studies have noted PEPFAR’s strong
vertical orientation in its support for national HIV responses,
often provided within parallel structures to those of donor–
recipient governments (Windisch et al., 2011; Luboga et al.,
2016; Ssengooba et al., 2017). We document a unique case
study that runs contrary to previous PEPFAR intensely ver-
tical aid approaches. There is little doubt that PEPFAR’s
multi-stakeholder engagement resulted in increased Uganda
government budgetary allocation for expanding the health
workforce in case-study districts. PEPFAR’s health-system
strengthening (HSS) intervention triggered the absorption of
694 HWs onto the public sector payroll. A notable finding
of this study was that PEPFAR’s multi-sectoral engagement of
high-level actors in Uganda generated buy-in from the influ-
ential Ministry of Finance, which technically commits votes
in the national budget. Although there are mounting calls for
engagement of Ministries of Finance in expanding fiscal space
for health (Whyle and Olivier, 2016), there is little research
documenting ‘catalyst’ engagements that result in tangible
outcomes, especially with regard to addressing the human
resources for health crisis. Our study suggests that sustained
engagements with the Ministry of Finance and other line
ministries helped 694 HWs transition to public sector pay-
rolls. However, Bennett et al. (2018) highlight the influence
of external development partners in providing the financial
impetus for initiating multi-sectoral collaborations, and note
that local actors may not have this leverage: ‘In LMIC, a
related factor concerns the role of external development part-
ners. Multi-sectoral action that has strong external support
likely has better access to financial resources, but may suffer
from limited local ownership (and hence perhaps low motiva-
tion), and conceivably organizational blue prints that do not
align with ways of doing business in country.’
A review article assessing HSS interventions by Adam et al.
(2012) recommends the application of a ‘systems thinking’
lens in designing HSS interventions that engage and cut across
the six ‘building blocks’ or sub-components of a health sys-
tem. In reflecting on participants’ discourses in this study,
we observe that PEPFAR’s Human Resources for Health sup-
port in Uganda and the subsequent donor transition effort
engaged with at least four intersecting health system ‘building
blocks’, namely, health financing, health information systems,
leadership and governance and health workforce (Van Olmen
et al., 2012; Mutale et al., 2013; Mounier-Jack et al., 2014;
Zakumumpa et al., 2018).
In this study, we found that PNFP facilities had lower
absorption rates of the workforce transitioned from PEPFAR
support at (30% absorption) compared to district local gov-
ernments with a 55% absorption rate. Our study adds to
accumulating calls for government support to the private sec-
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support (Zakumumpa et al., 2016) and the need for increased
engagement by donors and governments of the private sec-
tor in accelerating progress towards universal health coverage
(Montagu et al., 2016; Ssennyonjo et al., 2018; Wilhelm et al.,
2020).
The adopted five domains of the CFIR framework were
helpful in providing a broad deductive framework for our
overall synthesis and interpretation of study findings as well
as in their presentation—we note that although the frame-
work categorizes into five domains, some of our findings
appeared to cut across more than one domain. For instance,
we found that the prioritization of HWs in district wage
bill commitments derived from ‘inner setting’ priority set-
ting but was re-enforced by ‘outer setting’ factors such as
written memos from line ministries. In this sense, our study
suggests some dynamic interactions in facilitators of HW
transition in Uganda. The notion of dynamic interactions in
factors influencing the implementation and sustainability of
health programme interventions has been observed in previ-
ous studies (Durlak and DuPre, 2008; Stirman et al., 2012;
Zakumumpa et al., 2018)
The challenges of workforce recruitments in
decentralized settings
This study illuminates the dysfunction that underpins recruit-
ment freezes in decentralized settings in Uganda. This
ranges from insufficient basic operational funds for conven-
ing recruitment bodies, limited expertise in wage bill analysis,
district workforce budget caps and common perceptions of
nepotism and corruption in recruitment decisions. Previous
studies have reported the constraints encountered in health
workforce recruitments in decentralized systems in Uganda,
Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria (Ssengooba et al., 2007; Munga
et al., 2009; Sakyi, 2013; Frumence et al., 2013; Mbemba
et al., 2016; Sumah and Baatiema, 2019).
Our study does however highlight the potential influence
of ‘change agents’ in driving health system reform and in
unlocking fiscal space for health in a resource-constrained
setting. At an institutional level, we found that the pres-
ence of transition ‘champions’ at multiple levels including
within district governance systems but also at the facility
level was a key enabler of increasing budgetary allocations
for expanding the health workforce in Uganda. We find that
PEPFAR support had a ‘trigger effect’ that synergized the
role of internal ‘champions’ in promoting HSS. In influenc-
ing HSS in Uganda, PEPFAR can be said to have been acting
as a catalyst. The role of ‘external change agents’ is recog-
nized in implementation research (Means et al., 2020). Our
findings add to the accumulating evidence base pointing to
the influence of leadership and governance on health systems
development and outcomes in decentralized settings (Mitchell
and Bossert, 2010; Abimbola et al., 2019; Schneider et al.,
2020).
This study had a limitation that we wish to acknowledge.
Due to budgetary limitations, we were unable to select an
equal number of ‘high absorber’ and ‘lower absorber’ districts
to enable a more ideal comparative case-study analysis. How-
ever, the common attributes across our ‘low absorber’ cases
such as the absence of transition ‘champions’ and a lack of
prioritization of the health workforce in the district wage bill
suggests that these attributes could be common across a larger
sample of ‘low absorber’ districts.
Conclusion
Our case studies offer implementation research lessons on
effective donor transition and insights into pragmatic strate-
gies for increasing public spending on expanding the health
workforce in a low-income setting.
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